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APPELLATE JURISDICTION 
111,ill I nili in mil,ih il illllit tninulifiT I I I \ ) Srclion 7S 2a \| J )(|) gru ^ HI ' M I 
jurisdiction pursuant to the Order of the Supreme Court of the State of Utah dated June 
22, 2004, transferring this case from the Supreme Court to the Utah Court of Appeals 
pursuant to I J.C.A. Section /5-~ M>I . 
ISSI JES PRESENTED ON APPE \ I 
1. Whether the District Court correctly interpreted the Agreement and 
specifically the interpretation of paragraph two (2) of the Agreement and its relationship, 
or lack thereof, to paragraph three (3) of the Agreement, relative to the meaning and 
purpose of the protection period clause, 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The trial court's interpretation of a contract, including questions not requiring 
correctness. Ihis Court also reviews for correctness the trial court's grant of summary 
judgment pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c) and affords no deference to its legal 
conclusions. Green Rnct cancu , , . . . . . : _ u. , and 
Zion >s FU st Nt it B 15 • ., ' ' < " » • " " , ' • • ' • ^ W ) When a trial 
court's findings arise_from "stipulated facts" such findings : L t ! = taiitamount to conclusions 
of law, with the stipulation of facts being the functional equiv alent of true findings of 
fact. 
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DETERMINATIVE LAW 
1 • Contract Interpretation 
- Fairbourne Commercial v. American Housing, 94 P.3d 292 (Utah 2004). 
-Green River Canal Co., v. Thayn* 84 P.3d 1134, 1140 (Utah 2003). 
-Winegar VFroerer Corp., 813 P.2d 104, 108 (Utah 1991). 
-Zion 's First Nat. Bkf v. Nat. Am. Title Ins., 749 P.2d 651, (Utah 1988). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case. The nature of the case is a contract dispute involving the 
interpretation of a listing agreement relative to liability for a claimed commission owed 
to the realtor. 
Course of Proceedings. This action was precipitated by the filing of a complaint by 
Tom Heal Commercial Real Estate, Inc. (Hereinafter "Heal"). Heal's Complaint alleged 
among other things, breach of contract by Defendants, Glen Overton (hereinafter 
"Overton") and Zion's Holding Company, L.C., (hereinafter "Zions") a Utah limited 
liability company. The scope of these proceedings may be separated and identified in 
three separate phases as follows. (1) Litigation on allowance/disallowance of the 
underlying claimed commission to Heal, (2) the premature filing of a notice of appeal by 
Heal prior to the resolution of issues relating to allowance of attorney's fees, and (3) the 
appeal of the trial court's decision granting the motion to dismiss and allowing attorney's 
fees. 
Zion's responded to Heal's Complaint by filing a motion to dismiss (hereinafter 
6 
"Motion") on or about October 1 , 2003 I leal • : pp < : sed Zion' s Motion by filing a 
riitTii(iii,,iiniiiiiiiii in npp<v;iliim (lirrriMiifln "Rrsponsv") thind ,i i:uni|MMiril \\\ il In 
Affidavit of Tomas W. Heal. (Hereinafter "Heal Affidavit"). Thereafter, Zion's filed its 
Reply Memorandum to Plaintiffs Response to Zion's Holding Company, L.C.'s Motion 
to Dismiss. (Hereinafter "Repl> • lcican^i, > ,^ai tiled a "Surreply ' ^. ^ww ± K-pu. 
Zion\ I 111 en in I'll Il it Reply In Foal's Sunvply linn!1 llin iiiiulfH is sell I i In MMMI , lllin 
December 12, 2003.2 
Disposition Below. The District Court granted Zion's Motion. The gist of Zion's 
Motion was that there was relationship betwtx..
 r^. -grapiik - x nroK^aye r ce 3 
(Protection Period) inasmuch as the latter specifically references the former in the Listing 
Agreement & Agency Disclosure, (hen HI ill i "Agreement"). The interpretation of that 
Agreement and these two clauses is at the heart of tin* appea* Zion ^ argued that the 
P i o u x i • P u i u t l \ L i ! i M In ill I in i * . ' ( % , , i -• • 
to protect Heal's right to a commission for a finite period of time-i.e., two (2) years after 
the termination of the Agreement. Since the Agreement had expired on its own terms, no 
Zion's Reply raised new issues outside of the Motion and both counsel 
a g r e e c l t 0 i i^ f|ijng 0 f the Surreply in order that the Motion and all issues related ther^ •» 
be considered and resolved in one hearing. 
Prior to the hearing of the Motion on December 12, 2003, Heal filed a 
Motion to Serve Summons and Complaint on Defendant Overton Pursuant to Rule 
4(d)(3)(c). (Hereinafter "Heal Service Motion"). The Court heard oral argument on the 
Heal Service Motion which had been briefed and granted it. The Heal Service Motion is 
largely irrelevant to the issues on appeal 
7 
commission was owed. Heal's interpretation of the two clauses, on the other hand, was 
that such a commission was owed in perpetuity anytime there was a "lease renewal." 
Following the Court's decision on the Zion's Motion, Zion's filed an affidavit 
seeking attorney's fees and costs as allowed by the Agreement. The Affidavit of Steven 
F. Allred in Support of Fees and Costs (hereinafter "Allred Affidavit") was filed on or 
about January 14,2004. A hearing was conducted by the Court on the Allred Affidavit 
on April 22, 2004. At the conclusion of the hearing the Court granted the fees and costs 
requested in the Allred Affidavit ($5061.00) less $493.00 dollars. The Allred Affidavit 
was supplemented in the amount of $2,426.50 for fees and costs incurred by Zion's in 
seeking and obtaining dismissal of a premature notice of appeal filed by Heal.3 It was 
further supplemented in the amount of $1276.00 in preparing Findings of Fact 
(hereinafter "Findings") and Conclusions of Law4 (hereinafter "Conclusions") filed by 
Zion's for a total award of $8,270.50. 
3
 Heal filed his first Notice of Appeal on or about January 9, 2004-nearly 
three (3) months prior to the hearing on the issue of attorney's fees. On January 14, 2004, 
Zion's counsel corresponded with Heal's attorney and provided authority for his position 
that the appeal was premature and requested dismissal. 2'ion's request went unheeded by 
Heal. Zion's filed a motion to dismiss in the District Court and at the Court of Appeals in 
response to the latter's Sua Sponte Motion for Summary Disposition. On February 20, 
2004, the Court of Appeals dismissed Heal's first appeal, 
4
 Zion's spent considerable time preparing draft findings of fact and 
conclusions of law subsequent to the April 22, 2004, fee hearing. The parties, after much 
discussion, including the input of the trial court judge, stipulated to the Findings and 
Conclusions and certified the same. 
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
1 . / i o n mi in II III in II in II ill I in in in 1 Il In i II in mi II in 11, I n i t t i [ X i i i ) , s i p u n i l r m i d i l l . I n n I III in i l ; 
members and validly formed on or about February 2, 1997. See Addendum attached 
hereto. (Findings, Paragraph 1). 
2. On or about Junc ^N * y99, Heal prepared and Zion's executed a 
a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit "B."(Findings, Paragraph 2). 
3. The Agreement identifies "the Seller" as "Glen Overton\ and his 
interests."(Findings? Paragraph 3). 
4 . . t . - i i , - 1 ( - ' : . . ! ; -V n • [ i m p ° " 
ending on September 23,1999. (Hereinafter "the Listing Period").(Findings, Paragraph 
4). 
5. Para-i..r. - mandau 
Heal >* 7^ " "lease" or "lease renewal."(Findings, Paragraph 5). 
6. Paragraph 3 in the Agreement provides for protection of payments to Heal 
under the Agreement for a period of twenty-four months (hereinafter "the protection 
pern II I I  lull iiii|» the cApii.idiioii Il III 'Vgireiiiciil (Nrplnnl in 1 \ 1000) (Fin i ln ip 
Paragraph 6). 
7. On or about July 30, 1999, Heal provided Zion's with a tenant, Selnate 
U.S.J I. Co I tcL, for a three (3) year period. (Augu . -• n >. _ , : aiagiaj 
8. Uiii \ I in mi I I1! Mini / iinii - executed n soronrl I rase A preernent 
9 
(hereinafter "lease renewal") for a period of two (2) years.(Findings, Paragraph 8). 
9. Heal demanded a commission from Zion's for the lease renewal and 
Zion's refused to pay said commission on the basis that the lease renewal was entered 
outside of the expiration of the Agreement and the protection period. (Findings, Paragraph 
9). 
10. Defendant, Glen Overton, (hereinafter "Overton") an individual and 
member of Zion's resides outside of Utah and has been properly served in this 
action.(Findings, Paragraph 10). 
11. Zion's has submitted the Affidavit of Steven F. Allred in Support of Fees 
and Costs (hereinafter "Affidavit").(Findings, Paragraph 11). 
12. The Affidavit requests fees and costs in the amount of $5061.00 in 
conjunction with Zion's motion to dismiss and in opposition to Heal's motion to effect 
service on Overton by federal express up through and including January 7, 
2004.(Findings, Paragraph 12). 
13. The Affidavit has been supplemented orally and informally by Zion's in 
the amount of $2, 426.50 for fees and costs incurred with respect to the filing of the 
premature notice of appeal by Heal and for services incurred in conjunction with the 
amendment of these findings and an order of the Court through April 22, 2004. 
Additional fees have been incurred in obtaining entry of an order.(Findings, Paragraph 
13). 
14. Zion's corresponded with Heal on two separate and distinct occasions 
10 
and attempted unsuccessfully to persuai u. ... .,ompiami ana appeal or i isk 
-- i i b l r Ini t n \ s iiiiiiiill c o s t s p in 1111in v * '^ ^7-56 k bindings,, 
Paragraph 14). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
l l h ' I "I .Inin I l ml pinpi'il i i n t n p i e t n l llir Agivemrnl in i niil.iin ilh 
established I Jtah precedent relat ing to the interpretation of a contract. Thereafter the 
parties stipulated to appropriate findings of fact and conclusions of law. Sin 1 
interpretation, among other things, includes a dete the four corners of the 
Agrei iiiinili I ilrUMinim IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIMIIIIIIIIIIIIII , i I iiiiiiiill, iiiiiili  
the plain mean ing of the words util ized by the drafter and avoidance of harsh 
interpretations or rewrit ing or supplying missing terms. Based on consideration of all of 
the above, without need or resort to extrinsic evidence, uic Uibinci . . ... t was correct in 
\l%i- ' . • ' ' • «*nn i • , -neti lity 
to Heal on any lease renewal. 
ARGUMENT 
Heal's Interpretation oi Hie Agreeium " ' k vHh 
Established I,egal Precedent in the Sia Contract 
Interpretation. 
^ ^—*-** Interpretatl ci n in U t a h in Genei al 
The Distru'l iiiiiiii nun ill l l r n n t n il ,111111 1 ippinpriiilt tiKilysis in finding .uid 
concluding that the Agreement is not ambiguous by looking at the four (4) comers of the 
11 
document, that there is no need to resort to extrinsic evidence, that contract provisions 
within the Agreement are to be harmonized together, and interpreting the Agreement so 
as not to yield inequitable results. See Green River Canal Co., v. Thayn, 84 P.3d 1134 
(Utah 2003). The District Court's Conclusions, Paragraphs 4-7 identify and contain the 
proper analysis. Conversely, Heal's interpretation of the Agreement is inconsistent with 
such analysis. 
In Fairbourne Commercial v. American Housing, 94 P.3d 292 (Utah 2004) the 
Utah Supreme Court coincidentally examined a similar listing agreement between a 
broker and a vendor. The broker sued the vendor to recover a commission. The trial 
court interpreted the listing agreement and found that the vendor owed the broker a 
commission. The vendor appealed. On appeal the Utah Supreme Court reaffirmed the 
correct analysis when interpreting a contact as a matter of law. The Court stated: 
When interpreting a contract, a court first looks to the contract's four comers to 
determine the parties' intentions, which are controlling. If the language within 
the four comers of the contract is unambiguous., .a court determines the parties' 
intentions from the plain meaning of the contractual language as a matter of 
law... A contract provision is ambiguous if it is capable of more than one 
reasonable interpretation because of 'uncertain meanings of terms, missing terms, 
or other facial deficiencies...When interpreting a contact a court is to consider each 
provision in "relation to all of the others, with a view toward giving effect to all 
and ignoring none. (Emphasis added). 
Fairbourne at 295 citing to Bakowski v. Mountain States Steel, Inc., 15 P.3d 1179 (Utah 
2004); Winegar VFroerer Corp., 813 P.2d 104, 108 (Utah 1991) (quoting Faulkner v. 
Farnsworth 665 P.2d 1292, 1293 (Utah 1983); Green River Canal Co., v. Thayne, 84 
P.3d 1134 (Utah 2003). 
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B. Heal Concedes that The Agreement is Unambiguous and 
Therefore Resort to Extrinsic Evidence is Unnecessary 
Heal's contract interpretation analysis as gleaned from Appellant's Brief is at odds 
with the correct analysis as discussed above for several reasons. First, Heal states "[t]he 
above two conclusions of law ["Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Conclusions of 
Law Paragraph 7"] are in error and are inconsistent with the clear meaning and 
unambiguous language of the contract." (Emphasis added). (Appellant's Brief, at p. 16). 
Furthermore, Heal's introductory phrase to his ARGUMENT, 1A. states: "The Plain 
Meaning of the Listing Agreement Controls." (Emphasis added). (Appellant's Brief, at p. 
18). Accordingly, Heal's position is and must be that the Agreement is unambiguous. 
Heal further argues that the Agreement must be given its "plain meaning."5 
Therefore, Heal apparently does not challenge or dispute Conclusion, Paragraph 5 
[Only when an ambiguity exists which cannot so be reconciled may resort be had to 
extrinsic evidence, i.e., the affidavits of Tom Heal relating to the intent of the parties prior 
to execution of the Agreement and the purpose of the a protection period].6 Heal has 
5
 The meaning attributed to a document (usu. by a court) based on a 
commonsense reading of the words, giving them their ordinary sense and without 
reference to extrinsic indications of the author's intent. -Also termed ordinary meaning. 
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, 995 (Seventh ed. 1999). 
6
 If this is indeed Heal's position, then the BRIEF FOR AMICUS CURIAE 
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF REALTORS AND UTAH ASSOCIATION OF 
REALTORS (hereinafter "Amicus Brief) is superfluous and so is any discussion by Heal 
in his Brief as to the purpose of the protection period because it is extrinsic evidence. 
(Appellant's Brief, at pp. 20-23). 
13 
never argued and does not now argue that the District Court should have found that the 
Agreement is ambiguous.7 Therefore, the District Court need not resort to any extrinsic 
evidence to determine the parties' intent. On the contrary Heal relies upon and uses such 
language as "the Listing Agreement plainly states.../' (Appellant's Brief, at p. 18) "...but 
is governed by the clear language found at the end of Paragraph 2," (Appellant's Brief, at 
p. 17) "Paragraph 2 of the Listing Agreement clearly states..." (Appellant's Brief, at p. 
17), "...the Listing Agreement clearly mandates...,) (Appellant's Brief, at p. 17). 
C. HeaPs Interpretation of the Agreement Fails to Consider and 
Harmonize Sections 2 and 3 in the Agreement 
The second reason that Heal's analysis of the interpretation of the Agreement is 
flawed is that it fails to harmonize appropriately paragraphs 2 and 3 in the Agreement. 
Correct contract interpretation requires that a court "...consider each contract 
provision...in relation to all of the other with a view toward giving effect to all and 
ignoring none." Green River Canal Co,, v. Thayne, 84 P.3d 1134, 1141 (Utah 2003). The 
first source of any inquiry when a question arises is the document itself which should 
be looked at in its entirety and in accordance with its purpose and all of its parts should 
be given effect insofar as that is possible. Larrabee v. Royal Dairy Products Co., 614 
P.2d 160 (Utah 1980); Big Cottonwood Tanner Ditch Co. v. Salt Lake City, 740 P.2d 
7
 "A contract provision is ambiguous if it is capable of more than one 
interpretation because of 'uncertain meanings of terms, missing terms, or other facial 
deficiencies.'" Fairbourne, at p. 293 citing to Winegar V Froerer Corp., 813 P.2d 104, 
108 (Utah 1991). Heal makes no assertion that the Agreement is ambiguous. 
14 
1357 (Utah App. 1987); GGA, Inc. v. Laventis, 773 P.2d 841 (Utah App. 1989). A 
contract should be interpreted so as to harmonize all of its provisions. Jones, v. 
HinUe, 611 P.2d 733 (Utah 1980). 
Appellant's Brief and HeaFs contract analysis ignores this step. Nowhere in his 
Brief does Heal address the interrelationship of and specific reference to Section 2. 
Brokerage Fee in Section 3 of the Agreement, (3. Protection Period. "...Seller agrees to 
pay to the Company the brokerage fee stated in Section 2...") with the payment of a 
commission. Nowhere in Heal's Brief does he discuss the meaning and relationship or 
duration (i.e., "twenty-four months") of the protection period except to state that it is a 
"...separate concept..." (Appellant's Brief, at p. 20). In fact, Heal fails to even mention 
the specific reference in the latter clause to the former in the Agreement except as alluded 
to in the District Court's Conclusion, Paragraph 5. (Appellant's Brief, at p. 19). Heal 
simply relies on the expressed purpose of a protection period as outlined and explained in 
the Amicus Brief. (Appellant's Brief, at p. 19).8 Heal's analysis violates the Utah 
Supreme Court's most recent pronouncement to (1) [fully] consider each provision and 
(2) "ignore [ing] none." Fairbourne, at p. 295. Heal completely ignores this specific 
8
 Heal's analysis focuses solely on the language in Paragraph 2. Brokerage 
Fee in the Agreement that a commission is owed "...on any and all lease renewals at the 
time of such renewals...on the first day of the lease renewal commencement." 
(Appellant's Brief, at p. 18). Amicus Curiae deals briefly but indirectly with the "twenty-
four month" period. (Amicus Curiae Brief, at p. 9, footnote 1). However, the position of 
Amicus Curiae ignores Heal's obligation to "expressly and unequivocally" so provide in 
the Agreement. 
15 
reference and fails to consider, discuss or attempt to harmonize the same. 
D, The Purpose of the Protection Period is to Relieve Zion's of the 
Burden of Paying Duplicative/Unearned Commissions 
In Realty World Labrum v. Steadman, 131 P.2d 165 (Utah 1987) the Utah Supreme 
Court considered the purpose of a protection period clause in a listing agreement. In 
Realty, the vendor showed the home to the eventual purchaser. (Percival). Then the 
vendor listed his home for sale with a broker. (Strout) The listing agreement expired by 
its own terms. The vendor then listed the home with Realty World Labrum. (Hereinafter 
"Realty"). The Really listing agreement did not relieve the vendor of a duty to pay Realty 
a commission if Percival purchased the home. The Really listing agreement expired. The 
vendor then entered into a second listing agreement with Strout. That listing agreement 
contained a tailored protection period clause9 drafted by Steadman which the court found 
and held created a "sham" transaction. Realty, at p. 167. 
In Realty, the Court found that the purpose of a protection period clause is 
"fashioned to relieve homeowners [and presumably Commercial Landlords-i.e., Zion's] 
who list their property with a new agent at the expiration of an earlier listing agreement 
from the burden of paying commissions [or a commission] to both the original and the 
9
 That clause was drafted specifically for the particular situation by the 
defendant, Steadman, a sophisticated man who held " a doctorate in education and is 
experienced in real estate transactions; he has successfully completed a real estate course 
and has passed the test given by the state to persons applying for real estate licenses." 
Realty, at p. 166. 
16 
new brokers." [Or to a broker whose listing agreement expires by its own terms absent 
specific terms to the contrary.] While the Court in Realty found the drafting of the 
protection period clause to be "poor" it was nevertheless proper for the Court to "give 
effect to its obvious intent and purpose. Realty, at p. 176 citing Nagle v. Club 
Fountainbleu, 405 P.2d 346, (Utah 1965) (holding that such a clause is not designed to 
allow a homeowner to escape liability and payment of a valid commission by simply 
waiting for the expiration of the listing agreement).10 
E. The District Court's Interpretation of the Agreement as Drafted 
by Heal is Fair and Equitable and the Agreement Fails to 
Expressly or Unequivocally Provide for the Payment of a 
Commission in Perpetuity 
The third reason that Heal's analysis of the interpretation of the Agreement is 
flawed is 
[W]here there is doubt about the interpretation of a contract, a fair and equitable 
result will be preferred over a harsh and unreasonable one. And an interpretation 
that will produce an inequitable result will be adopted only where the contract 
expressly and unequivocally so provides that there is no other reasonable 
interpretation to be given it. (Emphasis added). 
10
 The holding in Realty is based on unique facts not present in this appeal. 
First, Zion's already paid Heal a commission. Second, the Agreement does not state and 
cannot reasonably be read to state that a commission is owed in perpetuity on any lease 
renewal. Third, there is no reason to believe that this transaction was a sham. The 
Agreement expired by its own terms on September 23, 1999. (Findings, Paragraph 6). 
The second lease was executed by Zion's on April 15, 2003-nearly nine (9) months after 
expiration of the first lease. (Findings, Paragraphs 7-8). 
17 
Green River Canal Co., v. Thayne, 84 P.3d 1134, 1142 (Utah 2003). Assuming arguendo 
that doubt exists with respect to the interpretation of the Agreement, Zion's dealt fairly 
with Heal and paid a Heal a commission pursuant to the first lease agreement. 
(Conclusion, Paragraph 1). Payment of a commission by Zion's is both fair and 
equitable. However, nothing in the record or the plain meaning or language of the 
Agreement suggests that Heal properly disclosed or bargained for a "commission in 
perpetuity under the Agreement."11 Heal as the drafter of the Agreement is in a superior 
bargaining position, and is held to a higher standard to insure that (a) the terms he wants 
are in fact included within the Agreement and (b) that such terms are fully disclosed and 
written clearly and concisely. See Conclusion, Paragraph 7. ("...Heal is the drafter of the 
Agreement, any ambiguity is construed against the drafter"). 
Heal's interpretation of the Agreement, if adopted, would elicit an inequitable 
result for the following reasons. First, the Agreement had already expired by its own 
terms. Second, Zion's already paid Heal a commission. Third, there is nothing in the 
record to suggest that Zion's acted in bad faith to avoid payment of an additional 
11
 Heal could have easily included language in the Agreement that a 
commission is owed "...on any and all lease renewals [in perpetuity] at the time of such 
renewals...on the first day of the lease renewal commencement." (Appellant's Brief, at p. 
18). Even better, Heal could have eliminated any reference to the Brokerage Fee within 
the Protection Period Clause or extended the protection period for a longer period or 
indefinitely. Heal's language and characterization of Zion's obligation (i.e., to pay a 
commission in perpetuity) is subtle at best! 
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commission12 or engaged in a sham transaction. Fourth, and most importantly, contrary 
to HeaFs assertion, if Heal failed to draft the Agreement in such a manner as to 
"unequivocally" provide for a payment of a commission in perpetuity then Heal-not 
Zion's, should bear the loss. 
Both the Appellant and the Amicus Curiae argue that the District Court's 
interpretation is at odds with the "industry-wide purpose of protection periods." 
(Appellant's Brief, at p. 18; Amicus Curiae Brief, at pp. 8-9). Such argument misses the 
point. Payment of a commission in perpetuity may have been HeaFs intent. However, 
unless Zion's knew, understood and mutually assented (to an unequivocal written 
expression of such intent) to payment of a commission in perpetuity under the 
Agreement, then the standard in the industry is irrelevant. See Equitable Life & Cas. Ins. 
Co. v. Ross, 849 P.2d 1187 (Utah App. 1993). Zion's position is that the Agreement is 
unequivocal in stating that Zions is not obligated to pay a commission in perpetuity. 
F. The Court Cannot Change the Bargain Between the Parties on 
the Basis of Supposed Equitable Principles 
The fourth reason that HeaFs analysis of the interpretation of the Agreement is 
flawed is "there is a long standing rule [of contract interpretation] in Utah that persons 
dealing at arm's length are entitled to contract on their own terms without the intervention 
12
 In fact, there is nothing in the record or the findings to suggest that Zion's 
was even aware that Heal claimed he was owed an additional commission, or that the 
Agreement so provided, until the filing of the complaint on or about August, 2003-nearly 
two years outside of the protection period identified within the Agreement. 
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of the courts to relieve either party from the effects of a bad bargain." Hal Taylor 
Associates v. UnionAmerica, Inc., 657 P.2d 743, 749 (Utah 1982) citing Biesinger v. 
Behunin, 584 P. 2d 801 (Utah 1978). See also Tomino v. Greater Park City Co., 570 P.2d 
698 (Utah 1977) (holding that a court will not rewrite a contract to supply terms which 
the parties omitted) and Dalton v. Jerico Construction Co., 642 P.2d 748, 750 (Utah 
1982) ( holding that "[I]t is not for a court to rewrite a contract improvidently entered into 
at an arm's length or to change the bargain indirectly on the basis of supposed equitable 
principles)." (Emphasis added). 
Both Heal and Amicus Curiae improperly request that this Court change the 
bargain entered into by the parties on the basis of supposed equitable principles,13 i.e., that 
the parties' intent should be gleaned from and inserted into the Agreement by the Court 
based on the standard in the industry. This Court cannot and should not write a better 
contract than Heal himself wrote. See Rio Algom Corp. V. Jimco Ltd., 618 0.2d 497, 505 
(Utah 1980). The Court cannot do for Heal what Heal himself failed to do. See Provo 
City Corp., v. Nielsen Scott Co., 603 P.2d 803, 806 (Utah 1979). Heal agrees that "[t]he 
district court cannot go back, rewrite the agreement...." (Appellant's Brief, a p. 18). 
13
 Amicus Curiae advance an additional and improper rationale for reversal of 
the District Court's opinion based on the equitable doctrine of unjust enrichment. 
(Amicus Curiae Brief, at pp. 9-10). Unjust enrichment is one branch of the equitable 
doctrine of quantum meruit. See Olson v. Park-Craig-Olson, Inc., 815 P.2d 1356,1360 
(Utah App. 1991). However, any recovery under a quantum meruit theory "presupposes 
that no enforceable contract exists." Davies v. Olson, 746 P.2d 264, 268 (Utah App. 
1990). This Agreement is and has been enforced. 
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II If this Court Reverses the District Court, Heal may be Entitled to an 
Award of Attorney's Fees. 
Zion's does not disagree that attorney's fees are available under the Agreement. 
(Appellant's Brief, at p. 25). Similarly, Zion's does not disagree that a provision for 
payment of attorney's fees in a contract includes attorney's fees incurred by a prevailing 
party on appeal as well as at trial. (Appellant's Brief, at p. 25). Under any circumstances, 
contingent upon a reversal by this Court of the District Court's interpretation of the 
Agreement, any determination as to any amount of fees to which Heal is entitled 
would be presumably determined on remand and only after entry of proper findings of 
fact and conclusions of law. 
CONCLUSION 
The District Court's interpretation of the Listing Agreement as outlined in the 
parties' and the Court's stipulated findings of fact and conclusions of law is correct. The 
District Court's decision strictly adheres to established legal precedent in this state 
regarding contract interpretation. Conversely, Heal's interpretation of the Agreement is 
either inconsistent with or ignores such precedent. Heal drafted the Agreement and failed 
to clearly express and unequivocally provide for payment of a commission in perpetuity 
despite the alleged standard in the industry. Protection periods are to relieve 
owners/landlords of the burden of paying commissions. If the Court were to adopt Heal's 
interpretation it would effectively re-write the Agreement and protect Heal when Heal 
failed to protect himself. Accordingly, this Court should affirm the District Court's 
21 
interpretation of the Agreement. 
DATED this z^day of October, 2004. 
LAW OFFICE OF STEVEN F. ALLRED, P.C. 
Steven F. Allred 
Attorney for Appellees 
22 
ADDENDUM 
Pursuant to Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 24(a)(l 1) the District Court's 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law are attached hereto. 
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER 
Civil No. 030403795 
JUDGE: Division 4 
On Friday, December 12, 2003, a hearing and oral argument was conducted to consider two 
ions, the first, a motion to dismiss filed by Defendant, Zion'sHolding Company, L.C, (hereinafter 
>n's") pursuant to Rule 12(b)(2) and (6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The second, a 
ion to allow service by federal express filed by the Plaintiff, Tom Heal Commercial Real Estate, 
(Hereinafter "Heal"). Steven F. Allred of the Law Firm of Steven F. Allred, P.C, appeared on 
ilf of Zion's. Allan Walsh of the firm of McKay, Burton & Thurman appeared on behalf of Heal. 
On April 22,2004, at 8:30 a.m., the Court conducted oral argument on the Fee Affidavit and 
Objection. (Hereinafter "the second hearing"). The same parties appeared as in the first hearing 
i the exception that Jeremy Sink, Esq., appeared for and in behalf of Allan O. Walsh. At the 
fusion of the second hearing the Court verbally ruled on the Fee Affidavit. The Court granted 
I'S Fee Affidavit in the amount prayed for in the Fee Affidavit less $493.00 related to Zion's 
osition to serving Glen Overton via Fed Ex. On May 5, 2004, the Court conducted a telephone 
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conference between the parties in which the Court directed the entry of a final judgment as to Zion's, 
pursuant to Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 54(b), because there is no just reason for delaying 
Heal's appeal as to Zions, and the Court stayed any further action as to Overton pending the 
resolution of the appeal. In conjunction with these motions and hearings, the Court enters the 
following findings of fact and conclusions of law. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Zion's is a Utah limited liability company, separate and distinct from its members 
and validly formed on or about February 2, 1997. See Exhibit "A" attached hereto. 
2. On or about June 30, 1999, Heal prepared and Zion's executed a "LISTING 
AGREEMENT AND AGENCY DISCLOSURE," (hereinafter "Agreement") a copy of which is 
attached hereto as Exhibit "B". 
3. The Agreement identifies "the Seller" as "Glen Overton/and his interests." 
4. The Agreement provides for a listing period beginning June 23, 1999 and ending on 
September 23, 1999. (Hereinafter "the Listing Period"). 
5. Paragraph 2 in the Agreement mandates the payment of commissions to Heal by 
Zion's for a "lease renewal." 
6. Paragraph 3 in the Agreement provides for a protection period to Heal 
under the Agreement for a period of twenty-four months (hereinafter "the protection period") 
following the expiration of the Agreement. (September 23, 1999). 
7. On or about July 30, 1999, Heal provided Zion's with a tenant, Selnate U.S.A. Co. 
Ltd., for a three (3) year period. (August 1, 2002). 
8. On April 15, 2003, Zion's executed a second Lease Agreement with Selnate U.S.A. 
Co. Ltd., (hereinafter "lease renewal"), for a period of two (2) years. 
9. Heal demanded a commission from Zion's for the lease renewal and Zion's refused 
to pay said commission on th^ basis that the lease renewal was entered outside of the expiration of 
the Agreement and the protection period. 
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10. Defendant, Glen Overton, (hereinafter "Overton") an individual and member of 
Zion's resides outside the state of Utah and has been properly served in this action. 
FINDINGS OF FACT REGARDING ATTORNEY'S FEES 
11. Zion's has submitted the Affidavit of Steven F. Allred in Support of Fees and Costs 
(hereinafter "Affidavit"). 
12. The Affidavit requests fees and costs in the amount of $5061 in conjunction with 
Zion's motion to dismiss and in opposition to Heal's motion to effect service on Overton by federal 
express up through and including January 7, 2004. 
13. The Affidavit has been supplemented orally and informally by Zion's in the amount 
of $2,426.50 for fees and costs incurred with respect to the filing of the premature notice of appeal 
by Heal and for services incurred in conjunction with the amendment of these findings and an order 
of the Court through April 22, 2004. Additional fees have been incurred in obtaining entry of an 
order. 
14. Zion' s corresponded with Heal on two separate and distinct occasions and attempted 
unsuccessfully to persuade Heal to dismiss his complaint and appeal or risk being liable for fees and 
costs pursuant to U.C.A. Section 78-27-56.5 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Notwithstanding the fact that the Agreement identifies "Glen Overton\AND HIS 
INTERESTS" as the "Seller" the Agreement was implicitly ratified by Zion's by virtue of Zion's 
payment to Heal of the commission associated with the execution of the lease between Zion's and 
Selnate. 
2. On April 15, 2003, Zion's entered into a lease renewal with Selnate and such lease 
renewal was executed outside of the listing period (September 24, 1999) and protection period 
(September 24, 2001) of the Agreement. 
3. The interpretation of a contract is a question of law. 
4. The preliminary question in the interpretation of a contract is whether the contract 
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contains a merger provision. The Agreement does contain such a provision. Accordingly, the 
presumption is that the Agreement represents the final expression of the parties' intent. 
5. The next inquiry is to examine the Agreement as a whole and to determine whether 
there is an ambiguity which cannot be reconciled by an objective and reasonable interpretation. See 
Green River Canal Co. v. Thayn, 84 P.3d 1134, 1142 (Utah 2003)(citation omitted)(noting that" 
we interpret "the terms of a contract in light of the reasonable expectations of the parties, looking to 
the agreement as a whole and to the circumstances, nature, and purpose of the contract"). Only 
when an ambiguity exists which cannot so be reconciled may resort be had to extrinsic evidence; i.e., 
the affidavits of Tom Heal relating to the intent of the parties prior to execution of the Agreement 
and the purpose of a protection period. 
6. There is no ambiguity in the Agreement inasmuch as paragraph three (3) in the 
Agreement specifically references paragraph two (2). When those provisions are harmonized 
together, not read in isolation to one another as Heal asserts, it is clear that a commission is payable 
by Zion's to Heal pursuant to the lease renewal only if it arises within the protection period which it 
does not. 
7. Heal's interpretation of the Agreement and specifically the interpretation of 
paragraph two (2) of the Agreement and its relationship, or lack thereof, to paragraph three (3) of 
the Agreement is unreasonable. The Agreement does not provide for a commission payment in 
perpetuity on any lease renewal. Such a commission is only due and owing if it arises within the 
protection period specified in the Agreement pursuant to a lease renewal. Furthermore, inasmuch as 
Heal is the draftor of the Agreement, any ambiguity is construed against the draftor. 
8. Service of Process by federal express on Overton is acceptable under the 
circumstances and Heal's motion to serve summons and complaint on Overton pursuant to Rule 
4(d)(3)(c) is granted. 
9. The Court will^ treat Zion's motion to dismiss as a motion for summary judgment 
under Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. There are no genuine issues of material fact 
4 
which are in dispute. As a matter of law the reasonable interpretation of the Agreement is that no 
commission is owed by Zion's to Heal on the lease renewal because it arose, if at all, outside of the 
protection period. Accordingly, the Court grants Zion's motion. 
10. The Court grants Heal's Motion to Serve Summons by federal express. 
11. The Court certifies this decision as it relates to Zion's Motion to Dismiss and the 
Court's interpretation of the contract pursuant to Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 54(b). 
Certification under Rule 54(b) is proper because there are multiple parties to the action, the judgment 
appealed from would be appealable but for the fact that Overton remains in the action and there is 
no just reason for delaying Heal's appeal. There is no just reason for delaying Heal's appeal because 
the other party to the action, Overton, is out of the country for an extended period of time on a work 
project, resolution of Overton's potential individual liability under the Agreement would cause both 
sides to incur further costs and attorneys' fees to conduct additional fact finding, and no just reason 
exists to wait for Overton's return to Utah. Thus, no just reason exists for delaying Heal's appeal 
as to the holdings in favor of Zion's and the propriety of certification under Rule 54(b). 
12. The Court hereby stays the prosecution of this action against Overton pending review 
of the certified portion of this Order. 
CONCLUSIONS REGARDING ATTORNEY'S FEES 
13. The Affidavit complies in all respects with Rule 73 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
14. The fees and costs sought by Zion's in the Affidavit ($5,061) were reasonable and 
necessarily incurred by Zion's except for the amount of $493.00 for Zion's opposition to Heal's 
motion to effect service on Overton. 
15. The fees and costs incurred by Zion's in defending against the filing of Heal's appeal 
in the amount of $2,426.50 were reasonable and necessarily incurred by Zion's inasmuch as the notice 
of appeal was filed prematurejy and was not an appealable, final order. 
16. The fees and costs incurred by Zion's in the preparation of the Order and these 
5 
Findings in the amount of $1,276.00 were reasonable and necessarily incurred by Zion's. 
17. Zion's made reasonable efforts to avoid incurring unreasonable attorney's fees and 
costs in defending against the lawsuit and the notice of appeal. In exercising its discretion whether 
to award fees and costs the Court takes into consideration a number of factors including but not 
limited to the amount at stake, the underlying merits of the complaint and appeal, the equities of the 
case and the law in Utah with respect to the prevailing party, including whether an award of fees and 
costs should be done on a piecemeal basis (who won the battle versus who won the war). 
18. The Court certifies this decision as it relates to the attorneys' fees owed to Zion' s for 
the same reasons as outlined in paragraph 11. 
19. Execution by Zion's on the attorneys' fees is stayed provided that Heal pays into the 
Court's registry $9,000.00 or posts a bond in the amount of $9,000.00 pursuant to Rule 62(i) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and Rule 6 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure in conjunction 
with any filing of a Notice of Appeal. 
20. Pursuant to Rule 7 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Heal shall pay into the 
Court's registry the amount of $7,500.00, or post a bond approved by the Court as security for costs 
and attorneys' fees of the appeal within the meaning of Rules 6 and 34 of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure. 
DATED this^fyoTMay, 2004. 
/S/DereK K Pultan 
Honorable Derek P. Pullan 
Fourth District Court Judge 
Approved As to Form & Substance: 
Allan O. Walsh/Jeremy C. Sink 
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